Dissertation Defense, Atulya JAIN, Economics and Decision Sciences

Congratulations to Dr Atulya JAIN, Economics & Decision Sciences, who successfully defended his doctoral dissertation at HEC Paris on the 27th of August, 2024.

Specialisation: Economics & Decision Sciences

Title: Essays in Information Economics

Supervisor: Professor Tristan TOMALA, HEC Paris

Jury members:

Professor Tristan TOMALA, HEC Paris, France
Professor Sarah AUSTER, University of Bonn, Germany
Professor Eran SHMAYA, Stony Brook University, USA
Associate Professor, Itai ARIELI, Technion- Israel Institute of Technology, Israel
Professor Vianney PERCHET, CREST, ENSAE, France
Professor Nicolas VIEILLE, HEC Paris, France

Abstract:

This thesis studies the strategic role of communication and information. It consists of four chapters. Chapter 1 examines the competing roles of information provision and interpretation in persuading a decision-maker. I find a trade-off between providing precise information and minimizing misinterpretation. Surprisingly, full disclosure can be suboptimal and even backfire. Nevertheless, strategic disclosure ensures the non-negative value of information, preventing harm from misinterpretation. Chapter 2 studies a dynamic game where an advisor sends probabilistic forecasts to a decision-maker. The decision-maker uses a calibration test based on past outcomes to verify the advisor’s forecasts. Overall, I find that the forecasts need to be accurate but can be less precise than truthful reporting. This work offers a micro-foundation for the commitment assumption in Bayesian persuasion. Chapter 3 studies a dynamic cheap talk model with no feedback. I find that the advisor benefits from dynamic interaction, even without feedback, partially restoring commitment. The advisor can deviate to any outcome where the distribution of messages remains unchanged. Chapter 4 studies the welfare properties of the Bayesian persuasion model, providing conditions for efficiency. We provide natural situations where misaligned preferences prevent the advisor from providing information that achieves efficiency.

Keywords: Bayesian persuasion, cheap talk, regret, calibration, dynamic games

Follow Atulya here.