PhD Dissertation Defense, Seyed Mohammad Taghi HOSSEINI, Strategy and Business Policy

Congratulations to Dr Seyed Mohammad Taghi HOSSEINI, Strategy and Business Policy, who successfully defended his doctoral dissertation at HEC Paris on October 24th, 2024.

Specialisation: Strategy and Business Policy

Title: Three Essays on the Governance of Multi-Partner Colloborations

Supervisor: Professor Bertrand Quélin, HEC Paris

Jury members:

Professor Bertrand Quélin, HEC Paris, France
Associate Professor Sinziana DOROBANTU, New York University, Stern School of Business, USA
Professor Carine STAROPOLI, Université de Rouen, Normandie, France
Associate Professor, Marieke HUYSENTRUYT, HEC Paris, France
Professor Sergio LAZZARINI, Insper Institute of Education and Research, Brazil

Abstract:
This dissertation investigates the governance complexities in multipartner collaborations (MPCs), with a focus on infrastructure projects facilitated through project finance. The research is motivated by the limitations of current theoretical models in c apturing the nuances of MPC dynamics, particularly in the presence of significant power disparities, extended formation times, and varied governance demands. The first essay investigates the relationship between legal frameworks and contractual governance in public-private partnerships (PPPs), focusing on how they economize on transaction costs. A particular concern in these cross -sector collaborations is the risks of governmental opportunism and maladaptation. Many countries have instituted specific laws aimed at reducing governmental opportunism and fostering private investment in PPPs. This study assesses how such laws influence PPP contracts, especially in terms of payment mechanisms—whether user-pay or government-pay. I argue that the specificity of PPP laws varies according to the political landscape and the public sector's expertise in managing PPPs. Our findings suggest that countries with well-established PPP units or strong institutional checks on government actions are more inclined to adopt user-pay contracts following the enactment of PPP-specific laws. Conversely, in countries with less developed PPP expertise or weaker institutional checks, PPP laws tend to favor government-pay contracts. The second essay examines the negotiation times between alliances within project-financed endeavors, specifically between sponsors and lenders. The findings indicate that alliance cohesion has a complex effect on negotiation duration. While internal cohesion within an alliance can expedite decision -making, it may also impede mutual understanding between alliances, which can extend negotiations. Integrating insights from social network and resource dependence theories, I argue that the dominant mechanism driving the relationship between alliance cohesion and inter-alliance negotiation time is contingent on the alliance's position of dependence. Facing greater uncertainty, the dependent alliance is more cautious and tends to focus more on its internal decision-making. However, the dominant group supplying critical resources is primarily concerned with achieving their objectives and leveraging their advantaged position. Thus, depending on the balanc e of power and resource needs between the involved parties, alliance cohesion can lead to different outcomes. The third essay addresses the role of dominant-partner governance in SPVs formed by multiple sponsors for large infrastructure projects. It reveals that while dominant partners, particularly governmental entities, can streamline decision-making processes, their involvement often introduces challenges such as conflicting objectives and political interference. The effectiveness of dominant-partner governance in orchestrating a larger and more diverse group of players is contingent upon the collaborative capabilities of the govern ment as well as the government's reliance on private resources and expertise. Overall, the thesis contributes to strategic management literature by offering a deeper understanding of how legal frameworks, contractual arrangements, and governance structures interact within MPCs.

Follow Mohammad on LinkedIn